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Abstract Using a theoretical model for risky investment decisions, we study the
effect of interest deductibility restrictions on the choice of organizational form. We
analyze the two most widely used approaches: first, rules that limit the interest
deductibility if the firm’s leverage exceeds a specific level, and second, rules that
restrict the interest deduction if the interest expenses exceed a specific percentage of
the firm’s earnings. Although these restrictions apply uniformly for partnerships and
corporations in many countries, we find that they usually distort the choice of
organizational form. We demonstrate that only leverage-based interest deductibility
restrictions can in theory be modified to achieve organizational form neutrality.
However, this requires a legal form dependent application or absence of dividend
taxation and in any case a full loss offset which is in contrast to current law in many
countries. If one considers corporate loss offset limitations, both types of interest
deductibility restrictions always distort the choice of organizational form. Thus, the
introduction of interest deductibility restrictions is actually in conflict with the
legislators’ often declared aim to design tax systems that are neutral with respect to
the choice of organizational form.
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1 Introduction
In most countries, dividend payments are non-deductible for tax purposes whereas
interest payments are. The different tax treatment of dividends and interest can
create an incentive to use debt. To combat the excessive use of debt financing, many
countries recently introduced new interest deductibility restrictions (see e.g.,
Webber 2010). Whereas prior rules only limit the deductibility for interest on
related-party debt, there is a trend to extend the deductibility restriction to all
interest payments including arm’s-length payments (e.g., Australia, Belgium,
Denmark, Germany, and Italy). Moreover, the new rules often apply not only to
corporations but also to partnerships and sole proprietorships (e.g., Australia,
France, and Germany). The approaches to determine excessive debt, however, differ
from country to country. Mainly two approaches are used: most thin capitalization
rules limit the deductibility of interest expense if the amount of debt exceeds a
specific leverage ratio. Instead of the leverage ratio, earnings-stripping rules specify
an interest coverage ratio. In this case, interest expense is only deductible up to a
certain percentage of the earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and
amortization (EBITDA).
While there is a large body of research on the effect of taxes on capital structure
decisions that has recently been reviewed by Feld et al. (2013), there are only a few
studies investigating the economic effects of interest deductibility restrictions
(IDR). Maßbaum and Sureth (2009) consider thin capitalization rules that are
characterized by a given permitted debt-equity ratio and investigate its impact on
firms’ financing decisions using the capital structure model of Miller (1977). They
show theoretically that thin capitalization rules may help explain why firms issue
both debt and equity even if the former is generally privileged by the tax law.
Empirical studies confirm the effectiveness of the leverage-based IDR to reduce
firms’ debt ratios (e.g., Overesch and Wamser 2010; Buettner et al. 2012) and
indicate a negative effect on firms’ real investments (Buettner et al. 2006).
Moreover, also the effectiveness of the EBITDA-based IDR is studied. Maßbaum
et al. (2012) use the German interest ceiling rule to theoretically study the impact on
firms’ capital structure choices. They find that the deduction restrictions often, but
not always reduce the benefit of debt financing. Empirical evidence indicates that
the German rules indeed lead to lower debt ratios and interest payments (Buslei and
Simmler 2012; Dreßler and Scheuering 2012) while there is yet no evidence on a
negative short-term effect on real investments (Buslei and Simmler 2012).
Although in many countries IDR are applied uniformly to partnerships and
corporations, previous economic research has studied only the effect on corpora-
tions. One exception is the work of Schmidt (2010) who compares the effect of the
German interest ceiling rule on the effective tax rate for partnerships and
corporations using numerical examples. However, she neglects tax differences
resulting from differences in liability restrictions between organizational forms and
does not carry out any formal analysis. Also, the large international literature on
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how corporate taxes affect organizational form decisions (e.g., Edmark and Gordon
2013; Elschner 2013; Luna and Murray 2010) does not yet examine the impact of
IDR.
The aim of the current paper is to fill this research gap by studying the effect of
IDR on the choice of organizational form. Our contribution is to show that IDR not
only distort capital structure and investment decisions, but, in general, also distort
the choice of organizational form, even if the IDR are uniformly applied to
corporations and partnerships. Only under very specific assumptions outlined in
Sect. 3.1, IDR do not affect the choice of organizational form. Thus, IDR are
typically in conflict with the legislators’ declared aim to design tax systems that are
neutral with respect to the choice of organizational form. Note that in the following
analysis we do not argue for or against organizational form neutrality, rather we
simply assume that the legislator aims at achieving this kind of neutrality. This
assumption is in line with several statements of legislators (Wagner 2006: 101). The
claim for organizational form neutrality also finds support by economic researchers
estimating the efficiency losses resulting from tax systems that are non-neutral with
respect to the organizational form (e.g., Gravelle and Kotlikoff 1993; Goolsbee
1998). However, we acknowledge that there is an ongoing controversial discussion
about the desirability of organizational form neutrality (e.g., Wagner 2006; Ewert
and Niemann 2012).
For the purpose of our study we extend a model previously used by Blaufus and
Hundsdoerfer (2008) and Blaufus and Mantei (2014) to incorporate leverage-based
as well as EBITDA-based IDR. In a baseline model we will assume full loss offset,
full deductibility of interest expenses as well as full taxability of default gains and
show that this will lead to organizational form neutrality if tax rates for both forms
are identical. Integrating IDR in the model, we find opposing effects: first, a
dividend effect which privileges the corporation due to the fact that IDR increase
only the corporate income tax burden but not shareholders’ taxes. Second, a default
gain effect which arises if default gains and interest expenses are treated
asymmetrically. If default gains (arising due to failure in debt redemption) are
taxed to a higher extent than interest is deductible, this discriminates against the
corporation. We demonstrate that organizational form neutrality can only be
achieved in the case of leverage-based IDR and requires a full loss offset, a
symmetric treatment of interest and default gains as well as either a legal form
dependent IDR or absence of shareholder taxation which is in contrast to actual
legal regulations. If we consider corporate loss offset restrictions, IDR always
distort the choice of organizational form.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: in the next section we
present the baseline model assuming full interest deductibility. Subsequently, we
present the incorporation of leverage-based and EBITDA-based IDR and derive the
effects on the choice of organizational form analytically. Section four extends the
model with respect to corporate loss offset restrictions. In the fifth section, we
provide numerical illustrations using a Monte Carlo simulation to examine the
effects of changing leverage ratios, risk-free interest rates, and investment risk on
tax differences between corporations and partnerships caused by IDR. The last
section presents conclusions and discusses implications for tax policy and research.
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2 Baseline model with full interest deductibility and full taxability of default
gains
We consider a one-period model under uncertainty. Risk neutral investors found a
company for a unique risky investment opportunity of size I0 at time t ¼ 0 and
decide about its legal form (lf ). They can choose between a corporation (lf ¼ c)
with liability limited to the invested amount and a partnership (lf ¼ p) with
unlimited personal liability. We use the subscripts c and p to denote either legal
form, and the subscript lf for the general case. The real investment is financed with
debt amounting to kI0 and equity amounting to 1 kð ÞI0, with exogenous 0\k 1.
Without loss of generality, we scale the initial investment expenditure to I0 ¼ 1.
Debt capital is offered by risk neutral creditors on a competitive capital market that
is free of arbitrage. We assume that debt is offered by third-parties and exclude
internal debt from our analysis. Risk-free capital is available at the risk-free interest
rate rf and risky capital at an interest rate i[ rf .
At time t ¼ 1, the project results in a gross return of uncertain cash flows x 0,
and debt service Dlf ðxÞ (debt amortization plus interest) as well as a tax payment
Tlf ðxÞ are due. A corporate income tax TcitðxÞ and a shareholder level tax TsðxÞ sum
up to the total tax burden TcðxÞ :¼ TcitðxÞ þ TsðxÞ for corporations, while
partnerships are treated as pass-through entities and taxed with personal income
tax TpðxÞ. Once all payments are made, the firm is liquidated.
The investors choose the organizational form such as to maximize their expected
future value E FVlf ðxÞ
 
, which results from the project’s cash flows less debt
service and tax payment,
FVlf ðxÞ :¼ x Dlf ðxÞ  Tlf ðxÞ: ð1Þ
Maximizing the expected future value is equivalent to maximizing the expected net
present value, E½NPVlf ðxÞ :¼ E½FVlf ðxÞ1þrf ð1siÞ  ð1 kÞI0, where interest is taxable at rate
si, since the invested equity ð1 kÞI0 is exogenous and the opportunity cost is,
therefore, constant.
The cash flows’ probability distribution f ðxÞ is independent of the legal form and
x may or may not suffice to cover the firm’s liabilities. If the investors choose a
partnership, we assume the potentially outstanding amount to be covered by
sufficient collateral from private wealth. Liabilities are, therefore, always
completely met and debt capital is available at the risk-free interest rate rf . The
partnership’s payment to the creditors is independent of the project’s uncertain
return, x, and amounts to the constant Dp :¼ k 1þ rf
 
.
If on the other hand the investors found a corporation, their liability is limited to
the firm’s wealth and the firm may default on debt payment if x is small. The
payment to the creditors is given by
Dc xð Þ :¼ min k 1þ ið Þ; x TcitðxÞf g: ð2Þ
Note that the default probability is not exogenously given by the probability dis-
tribution of x, but rather depends as well on the tax function TcitðxÞ and is
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interdependent with the debt interest rate i. We define x0 as the critical cash flow
that is necessary to satisfy the creditors after considering tax payments. The default
probability is now given as Pðx\x0Þ, where P is the probability measure. Note that
in case of a taxable loss, the tax payment is negative and increases the payment to
the creditors, as long as full loss offset is assumed.
We assume symmetric information, and the risk neutral creditors thus charge a
risk premium q[ 0 to the risky interest rate i :¼ rf þ q such that the expected debt
payment equals the certain payment kð1þ rf Þ. Note that q is not a risk premium in
the meaning of expected utility theory, but rather describes the difference between
the nominal interest rate and risk-free interest rate. Due to the risk-neutrality of
creditors, the expected interest rate always equals the risk-free interest rate. The
interest rate is, therefore, endogenously determined by the condition
E½Dc ¼! kð1þ rf Þ ¼ Dp: ð3Þ
The investors choose the organizational form that leads to the higher expected
future value. The optimal choice is denoted as lf :
lf  :¼ c; if E FVcðxÞ½ [E FVpðxÞ
 
;
p; if E FVcðxÞ½ \E FVpðxÞ
 
:
(
ð4Þ
Applying (1) and (3) easily shows that the investors’ decision only depends on the
expected tax payments E TcðxÞ½  and E TpðxÞ
 
:
E FVcðxÞ½ [E FVpðxÞ
 
, E x½   E DcðxÞ½   E TcðxÞ½ [E x½   Dp  E TpðxÞ
 
, E TcðxÞ½ \E TpðxÞ
 
:
ð5Þ
The investors choose the legal form with the smaller expected tax burden. If
E TcðxÞ½  ¼ E TpðxÞ
 
, risk neutral investors are indifferent between the legal forms
and between limited and unlimited liability.
Exogenous parameters are the investment amount I0; the leverage k; the risk-free
interest rate rf as well as the tax rates and the later introduced IDR parameters.
Endogenous and certain are the risk-free debt service Dp, the later introduced
critical cash flows xDG, x2p; x2l and the dividend effect. All other variables including
the risky interest rate are stochastic.
2.1 Assumptions on taxation
Regarding taxation, the following assumptions apply for the whole analysis:
– Full capitalization of the investment expenditure I0 in t ¼ 0 and full depreciation
in t ¼ 1.
– Proportional tax rates slf .
– Full and immediate loss offset. (This assumption is weakened in Sect. 4.)
– Debt capital is redeemed before interest is paid.
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Furthermore, we assume for the baseline model:
– Full deductibility of interest expenses.
– Full taxability of default gains.
A corporation defaults, if cash flows after tax do not suffice to cover debt
redemption plus interest. Default gains arise when the corporation pays back less
than the nominal debt amount k and not even partial interest, i.e., the case
DcðxÞ  k\0. Note that default gains cannot be ‘‘distributed’’ to shareholders since
claims of creditors are met first. Dividend payments require full debt redemption
and interest payment. The economic ‘‘benefit’’ of default gains is that losses are
partially borne by creditors instead of by the investors’ equity. The default gain on
corporate level mirrors the creditors’ default loss.
The taxation of the creditors’ interest income has no impact on the creditors’
calculus in (3) and is, therefore, neglected. To see this, assume that interest income
is taxed at rate si and the creditors’ expected net payment is thus Dnetp ¼
kð1þ rf ð1 siÞÞ in case of a partnership and E½Dnetc  ¼ kþ E½Dc  k  ð1 siÞ in
case of a corporation. Now note that the term ð1 siÞ is cancelling out in
E½Dnetc  ¼! Dnetp , resulting in condition (3) from above.
2.2 Expected tax payments
A partnership’s taxable income is the project’s gross return less the depreciation of
I0 ¼ 1 and less the certain interest payment to the creditors. With the personal
income tax rate sp, one obtains
E TpðxÞ
  ¼ spE x 1 krf
  ¼ spE x 1 Dp  k
  
: ð6Þ
Regarding a corporation, one has to additionally differentiate between corporate
level and shareholder level taxation. Applying the corporate income tax rate scit, one
obtains the corporate level tax payment as
TcitðxÞ :¼ scitðx 1 ðDcðxÞ  kÞÞ: ð7Þ
Due to the limitation of liability, there are three differences in the tax base on
corporate level in comparison to the partnership’s tax base: first, the demanded
interest rate is higher than the partnership’s interest payment (compensating the
default risk) so that the actual interest payment may be greater. Second, the actual
interest payment may be smaller in case of insufficient cash flows. Third, default
gains DG :¼ maxfk DcðxÞ; 0g occur if the corporation’s liquidity does not cover
redemption of debt. Depending on the realization of x, the tax base is either reduced
by the interest payment DcðxÞ  k[ 0, if x TcitðxÞ[ k, or increased by the
default gains DcðxÞ  k\0, if x TcitðxÞ\k.
Integrating the shareholder level taxation, TsðxÞ, with tax rate ss and taking
expectations results in the corporation’s expected total tax burden,
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E TcðxÞ½  ¼ E TcitðxÞ þ TsðxÞ½  ¼ sc  E x 1 ðDcðxÞ  kÞ½ ; ð8Þ
where sc ¼ scit þ ss  1 scitð Þ: Using (3), the comparison of (6) and (8) shows that
the expected tax burdens differ in the tax rates only. To analyze distortions in the
choice of organizational form which are caused by variations in interest deduct-
ibility, we abstract from tax rate differences and set sp ¼ sc ¼: s, so that the
expected future values of partnership and corporation are equal within the baseline
model. Accordingly, risk neutral investors are indifferent between the two organi-
zational forms. Note that we do not aim at deriving tax planning recommendations
for entrepreneurs. In this case, we would have to integrate all other tax differences
between legal forms as is common in tax planning studies on the choice of orga-
nizational form using complete financial plans (e.g., Ko¨nig et al. 2013).
3 Interest deductibility restrictions (IDR)
In this section we analyze the effects of the two most common interest deductibility
restrictions on thechoiceof organizational form.From thebaselinemodel’s neutral design
it is clear that any preference for a partnership or a corporation must be caused by the
analyzed interest deductibility restriction. After the expected tax burdens of both
organizational formsdoexactlymatch in thebaselinemodelwith full interest deductibility
and full taxability of default gains, i.e., E TcðxÞ½  ¼ E TpðxÞ
 
, it is now sufficient to
analyze the additional tax burden E DTlf ;IDRðxÞ
 
that is caused by the respective IDR.
Investors prefer a partnership over a corporation ifE DTp;IDRðxÞ
 
\E DTc;IDRðxÞ
 
and
vice versa. In case of E DTp;IDRðxÞ
  ¼ E DTc;IDRðxÞ
 
they are indifferent. In the
corporation case, IDR apply on corporate level only and shareholder level tax is only
indirectly affected by the change in dividend payments. The expected total tax
increase is E½DTc; IDRðxÞ ¼ ð1 ssÞE½DTcit;IDRðxÞ.
To analyze an IDR, one has to specify the cases in which interest payments do and
do not occur. While the partnership’s interest payment is certain and does not depend
on the project’s return, the corporation’s interest payment or default gain do depend on
the realization of x. As long as x\kþ TcitðxÞ, the corporation not only fails to pay
any interest, but moreover realizes a default gain for paying back less than the
nominal debt amount. For x[ kþ TcitðxÞ, debt capital is fully redeemed and interest
paid at least partially. Full interest payment requires x kð1þ iÞ þ TcitðxÞ. We
define xDG and x0 as the critical gross returns that distinguish between the three
cases, as is illustrated in Fig. 1.
λi
x
corporation’s interest payment
no
interest
payment
x0xDG
λrf
payment
full
interest
partial
interest
payment
0
risk premium
creditors’ risk
Fig. 1 Critical cash flows for a corporation
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3.1 IDR based on leverage ratio
3.1.1 General model
The most widespread class of IDR links the limitation of interest deductibility to the
leverage ratio. Interest payments are deductible as far as a fixed leverage ratio a,
defined as debt-to-equity ratio, is not exceeded. Interest payment on excessive debt
is non-deductible. Typical admissible debt-to-equity ratios reach from 1.5 to 1
(France, the United States, and until 2008 also Germany, equivalent to a debt-to-
total assets ratio of 60 %) over 2 to 1 (Canada), 3 to 1 (Japan and New Zealand), and
4 to 1 (the Netherlands, Latvia and Lithuania) up to 6 to 1 (Luxembourg). For a
broader overview of allowance limits refer to Webber (2010). For given equity
ð1 kÞ, the admissible debt, the so-called ‘‘safe haven’’, is the product að1 kÞ.
For low leverage k a
1þa, the IDR is not binding, as k að1 kÞ, i.e., the actual
debt is below the admissible debt. The additional tax is zero and the baseline model
applies. This holds for both corporations and partnerships. For leverage above that
limit, the excessive debt is k að1 kÞ: total debt less admissible debt. Interest
payments are non-deductible to the part that the total debt exceeds the admissible
debt, i.e., the ratio of excessive and total debt. We define a0 as that ratio,
a0 :¼ k að1 kÞ
k
¼ 1 a
K
; ð9Þ
where K :¼ k
1k is the actual leverage ratio, and we name a
0 the non-deduction
factor. For total interest payments Dlf ðxÞ  k[ 0, the amount of non-deductible
interest is a0ðDlf ðxÞ  kÞ. Hence, for given leverage, the restriction in interest
deductibility can be expressed by a proportional factor a0 that is modulated by the
choice of k. While the admissible leverage ratio a may be any positive real number,
the non-deduction factor a0 is 2 ð0; 1, if k[ a
1þa, and zero otherwise.
The partnership’s interest payment is independent of the realization of x and
leads to a certain additional tax payment of
E DTp1
  ¼ spa0 Dp  k
  ¼ spa0krf : ð10Þ
By contrast, the corporation’s interest payment depends on the realization of x, as
outlined in Fig. 1. The corporation’s additional tax payment is scita0ðDc1ðxÞ  kÞ
when interest is paid, i.e., if x[ xDG. Default gains are usually fully taxable and
unaffected by leverage-based IDR and there is neither additional tax expense nor
refund, when x xDG. Alternatively, the legislator might consider the corresponding
occurrence of default gains and set an equivalent proportional factor b0 with
0 b0  1 to exempt default gains. German tax law before 1998, for example,
applied b0 ¼ 1. If so, in comparison to the baseline model default gains lead to a
negative additional tax of scit b
0ðDc1ðxÞ  kÞ, where Dc1ðxÞ  k\0. An increase in
corporate level tax leads to an equally large decrease in dividend payment and a
decrease in shareholder level tax, such that the expected total increase in tax burden
including shareholder taxation is
10 Business Research (2015) 8:3–37
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E DTc1ðxÞ½  ¼ 1 ssð Þscit  E IDR1ðxÞ½ ; ð11Þ
where
IDR1ðxÞ ¼
a0 Dc1ðxÞ  kð Þ; if x[ xDG;
b0 Dc1ðxÞ  kð Þ; if x\xDG;
0; if x ¼ xDG:
8
><
>:
ð12Þ
For a0 ¼ 0, the actual debt does not exceed the admissible debt and interest expenses
are fully deductible, and for b0 ¼ 0, default gains are fully taxable, as in the baseline
model. Interest non-deductibility increases with a0 and default gain exemption with
b0. For a0 ¼ 1 and b0 ¼ 1, interest expenses are fully non-deductible and default
gains are fully tax-exempt. The non-deductible amount of interest expenses,
a0 maxfDlf  k; 0g, leads to an increased tax payment, whereas the exempted
amount of default gains, b0 minfDlf  k; 0g, leads to a reduced tax payment. For
b0 ¼ a0, default gains are tax-exempt to the same proportion that interest is non-
deductible.
To simplify the comparison of E DTp1
 
and E DTc1½  we solve E½IDR1ðxÞ in (11),
rearrange the result, use that ð1 ssÞscit ¼ s ss and obtain:
Lemma 1
E DTc1ðxÞ½  ¼ s a0krf|ﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄ}
AT
 ss a0krf|ﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄ}
div effect
þ 1 ssð Þscit b0  a0ð Þ 
Z xDG
0
Dc1ðxÞ  kð Þf xð Þdx
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
DG effect
:
ð13Þ
where f ðxÞ is the cash flow distribution’s probability density function.
All omitted proofs can be found in the ‘‘Appendix’’.
The first term, AT, represents the additional tax burden when a symmetric default
gain exemption is assumed, i.e., a0 ¼ b0, and when dividend taxation is neglected.
AT is constant and matches the partnership’s additional tax. For any positive
shareholder tax rate ss[ 0, the second term is nonzero and countervails the
additional tax burden with a negative ’tax factor’ ss: We call this the dividend effect.
For any b0 6¼ a0, i.e., asymmetric treatment of default gains, the third term becomes
nonzero, which expresses the change in total tax burden caused by the asymmetric
treatment. The effect’s sign depends on the relation of a0 and b0.
To further analyze the effects on the choice of organizational form, we now
compare Eqs. (10) and (13) for varying parameters. We consider different corporate
tax systems as well as variations in the taxation of interest payments and default
gains. The investors are indifferent if and only if the default gain effect and the
dividend effect are of equal value,
E DTc1ðxÞ½  ¼ E DTp1ðxÞ
 , DG effect ¼ div effect: ð14Þ
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3.1.2 Symmetric treatment of interest and default gains
We first consider symmetric treatment of interest and default gains (0\a0 ¼ b0  1)
in a tax system where dividends are tax-exempt (ss ¼ 0). Second, we consider a tax
system where dividends are taxed at a rate ss[ 0.
Within our model framework, the following propositions hold:
Proposition 1 In a tax system with symmetric treatment of interest payments and
default gains and without shareholder level taxation, investors are indifferent
between a partnership and a corporation.
Proof For ss ¼ 0, the dividend effect is zero and due to a0 ¼ b0, the DG effect is
zero, too. The remaining additional tax AT equals the partnership’s expected
additional tax burden, thus
E DTc1ðxÞ½  ¼ AT div effectþ DG effect
¼ sa0krf  0þ 0 ¼ E DTp1ðxÞ
 
:
ð15Þ
The considered tax system is neutral in the sense that the choice of organizational
form is not distorted by the IDR. h
Note that the depicted equality holds for the expected values only. For any given
x, the actual tax payments do generally differ between the two forms.
The intuition for the organization form neutrality is as follows: The tax
exemption of default gains works as a compensation for the interest deductibility
restrictions. If interest and default gains are treated symmetrically for tax purposes,
this ensures that the expected payments to the creditors are (partly) tax deductible.
As the expected payments to the creditors do not depend on the legal form in our
model, the effect of the IDR is the same for corporations and partnerships as long as
no other tax difference (e.g., dividend tax) exists.
Proposition 2 In a tax system with symmetric treatment of interest and default
gains and with shareholder level taxation, investors choose a corporation.
Proof The default gain effect remains zero, whereas the dividend effect now
becomes positive:
E DTc1ðxÞ½  ¼ AT div effectþ DG effect
¼ sa0krf  ssa0krf þ 0\sa0krf ¼ E DTp1ðxÞ
 
:
ð16Þ
The expected additional tax burden is smaller for corporations than for partnerships.
h
Integrating dividend taxation into a former neutral tax system with symmetric
treatment of interest and default gains distorts the choice of organizational form.
The allocation of the tax burden onto corporate level and shareholder level causes
an advantage for the corporation that can, however, be compensated by adjusting the
IDR’s parameters. To ensure neutrality of the tax system, the IDR’s design has to
account for the organizational form. The partnership’s disadvantage due to the
higher tax rate on firm level must be compensated by a lower restriction factor.
12 Business Research (2015) 8:3–37
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Within our model framework, the following proposition holds:
Proposition 3 In a tax system with symmetric treatment of interest and default
gains and with shareholder level taxation, there exist specific a0p 6¼ a0c for
partnerships and corporations such that investors are indifferent between a
partnership and a corporation.
Proof
E DTc1½  ¼ E DTp1
 , s ssð Þa0ckrf ¼ sa0pkrf , a0p ¼ a0c 1
ss
s
 
: ð17Þ
A neutral tax system requires either a0p ¼ a0c ¼ 0 (no interest deductibility restric-
tion) or ss ¼ 0 or a0p\a0c with the relation in Eq. (17). h
3.1.3 Asymmetric treatment of interest and default gains
We now consider asymmetric treatment of interest and default gains,
a0 6¼ b0 2 ½0; 1, first in a tax system where dividends are tax-exempt (ss ¼ 0), and
subsequently in a tax system where dividends are taxed at a rate ss[ 0.
Within our model framework, the following propositions hold:
Proposition 4 In a tax system with asymmetric treatment of interest and default
gains and without shareholder taxation, investors choose a corporation if a0\b0
and a partnership if a0[ b0.
Proof As in Proposition 1, no dividend effect occurs and the corporation’s tax
burden exceeds the partnership’s if the DG effect is positive. We obtain
DG effect ¼ b0  a0ð Þ 1 ssð Þ  scit
ZxDG
0
ðDc1ðxÞ  k
zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{\0
Þ f xð Þ dx; [ 0 , a0[ b0; ð18Þ
because Dc1ðxÞ  k\0 8x\xDG. For a0[ b0, the DG effect is positive and the
corporation’s tax burden exceeds the partnership’s. Vice versa for a0\b0. h
The DG effect is a measure for discrimination. If it is positive (negative),
corporations are ceteris paribus relatively discriminated against (privileged).
Discrimination of an organizational form thus depends on the taxable treatment
of default gains.
Proposition 5 In a tax system with asymmetric treatment of interest and default
gains and with shareholder level taxation, investors choose a corporation if a0\b0.
For a0[ b0, the investors’ choice depends on the cash flows’ distribution
assumption.
Proof Both effects are nonzero and we have
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E DTc1ðxÞ½ \E DTp1ðxÞ
  , sa0krf  div effect þ DG effect\sa0krf
, DG effect\div effect: ð19Þ
The dividend effect is positive and always privileges the corporation. The sign of
the default gain effect is parameter dependent. For a0\b0; it adds on top of the
dividend effect and makes the corporation even more privileged. In the opposite
case a0[ b0, the DG effect has positive sign and counteracts the dividend effect:
DG effect\div effect , b0  a0ð Þ 1 ssð Þscit 
ZxDG
0
Dc1ðxÞ  kð Þf xð Þ dx
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
\0
\ssa0krf :
ð20Þ
The total effect privileges the corporation if a0\b0, and in the opposite case depends
on the absolute values of both effects, which of the default gain effect in turn
depends on the probability distribution of x. Without a distribution assumption, the
total effect is undetermined. h
Proposition 6 For a0 6¼ b0, ss 0 and 0\scit\1, there exist in general neither
specific a0p; a
0
c, nor other parameter modifications such that the investors are
indifferent regarding the legal form.
Proof A tax regime that is neutral to the choice of legal form for any possible
distribution assumption requires that one form’s expected tax burden does not
depend on the cash flow distribution if the other’s does not either. From (10) we
know that the partnership’s expected tax burden is constant, i.e., does not depend on
the distribution of x. We have just seen that the dividend effect is constant, too, but
the default gain effect in general is not. We now further analyze the default gain
effect and show that no parameter tweaks can change this result. Given this, the tax
system cannot be neutral.
The default gain effect in (13) is the product of a tax factor and the default gain
expectancy,
DG effect ¼ 1 ssð Þscitðb0  a0Þ  EDG; ð21Þ
where EDG :¼
Z xDG
0
ðDc1ðxÞ  kÞf ðxÞdx: ð22Þ
h
Lemma 2 Solving Eq. (22) yields xDG ¼ k scit1scit  ð1 kÞ and
DG effect ¼ ða0  b0Þð1 ssÞscit 1 scit
1 scitð1 b0Þ
 E xDG  xjx\xDG½   Pðx\xDGÞ:
ð23Þ
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The default gain effect is the product of a tax factor, the expected shortfall in cash
flows in case of x\xDG and the probability of x\xDG. The legislator can specify the
tax factor, but obviously not the distribution dependent factors. The tax factor is
zero if and only if scit ¼ 0 (no corporate level taxation), scit ¼ 1 (100 % taxation on
corporate level), ss ¼ 1 (100 % taxation on shareholder level) or a0 ¼ b0 (symmetric
treatment of interest payments and default gains). For any other parameters, the tax
factor is nonzero and the DG effect is distribution dependent. h
3.2 IDR based on EBITDA
Instead of defining a maximum admissible debt ratio, some tax jurisdictions limit
the fraction of net earnings to be admissibly spent on interest. We consider an IDR
that permits interest deduction up to the fraction c[ 0 of earnings before interest,
taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA). Exceeding interest payments are
non-deductible. Typical values for c are 30 % (Germany since 2008 and Italy) and
50 % (United States, applied as an additional condition after the debt-to-equity test).
In line with our baseline model, we assume full depreciation of the investment
expenditure at t ¼ 1 with the result that the EBITDA equals the cash flows x. The
maximum amount of deductible interest expenses is thus cx and the non-deductible
interest amounts to maxfDlf ;2ðxÞ  k cx; 0g. Hence, the effectiveness of this IDR
and, therefore, the additional tax burden, too, depend on the realization of x: as x
increases, the admissible amount of deductible interest increases. Note that in
contrast to Sect. 3.1, the parameter c denotes the deductible fraction of the EBITDA.
Within our model framework, the following proposition holds:
Proposition 7 In a tax system where interest deductibility is restricted to a
fraction c of EBITDA, the investors’ choice of organizational form depends on the
cash flows’ distribution.
Proof While the partnership’s interest payment krf is certain, the deduction limit
cx is not. We define x2p as the critical cash flow that just allows the partnership to
deduct the whole interest, i.e., x2p :¼ krfc . For x x2p (x\x2p), interest expenses do
not exceed (do exceed) the admissible amount cx. For x ¼ 0, the admissible amount
is zero and interest expenses are fully non-deductible.
Hence, the partnership’s additional tax depends on the realization of x:
DTp2ðxÞ ¼ sp 
krf  cx; if x\x2p;
0; else:
	
ð24Þ
The expectation is
E DTp2
  ¼ sp krf  cE xjx\x2p
    Pðx\x2pÞ: ð25Þ
The IDR is effective for the partnership, if Pðx\x2pÞ is positive, i.e., if chances are
that cash flows can fall below the threshold of x2p, which depends on the distribution
assumption. A positive probability for x ¼ 0 is usually assumed.
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The case is more complex for the corporation: not only does the allowance limit,
cx, increase with x, but the interest payment, Dc2ðxÞ  k, does, too, until it
approaches the due amount ki at x ¼ x2, as depicted in Fig. 2. If the allowance
parameter c is sufficiently large, the IDR may not be binding for the corporation at
all. If so, investors choose a corporation, should the IDR be binding for the part-
nership, and they are indifferent if the IDR is effective for neither legal form.
If the IDR is instead effective for the corporation for some x, one must determine
the condition on x for the effectiveness. We define x2 as the minimum cash flow that
allows full debt service, i.e., x2 :¼ inffxjDc2ðxÞ ¼ kð1þ iÞg. The excess interest,
Dc2ðxÞ  k cx, reaches its maximum at x2, because the actual interest remains
constant from there on as the allowance limit further rises. It eventually becomes
zero at x2u :¼ inffxjDc2ðxÞ  k cx ¼ 0; x[ x2g, which is an upper bound for the
effectiveness of this IDR, similar to x2p for the partnership. In case of default
(x\x2), there are three sub cases: no interest payment occurs if Dc2 xð Þ  k 0,
thus, the restriction in interest deductibility cannot lead to an additional tax pay-
ment. For 0\Dc2 xð Þ  k\ki, interest liabilities are partly paid, but the IDR causes
an increase in the tax base only if also Dc2 xð Þ  k cx[ 0. We define
x2l :¼ inffxjDc2ðxÞ  k cx 0g, which is the lower bound for the IDR’s effec-
tiveness.
The tax burden on corporate level with respect to the interest deductibility
restriction is now
Tcit2ðxÞ ¼ scitðx 1 ðDc2ðxÞ  kÞÞ þ scit  IDR2ðxÞ; ð26Þ
where
IDR2ðxÞ ¼
Dc2ðxÞ  k cx; if x 2 ðx2l; x2uÞ;
0; else;
	
ð27Þ
and taking expectations yields
E½Tcit2ðxÞ ¼ scitE½x  scitð1þ krf Þ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
¼E½TcitðxÞ
þscit  E½IDR2ðxÞ: ð28Þ
Using this, the expected change in corporate level tax is E½DTcit2ðxÞ :¼
E½Tcit2ðxÞ  E½TcitðxÞ ¼ scitE½IDR2ðxÞ and considering shareholder level taxation
on the hereby reduced dividend payout yields the total expected additional tax,
x2ux2p
λrf − γx
partnership’s interest payment, λrf
0
λi
x
λrf
corporation’s interest payment, Dc2(x) − λ
γx
Dc2(x) − λ − γx
x2l x0x2r x2
default eﬀect
risk premium eﬀect
Fig. 2 Effects of an EBITDA-based IDR
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E½DTc2ðxÞ ¼ ð1 ssÞscitE½IDR2ðxÞ: ð29Þ
Lemma 3 Solving Tcit2ðxÞ and IDR2ðxÞ yields
E½DTc2ðxÞ ¼ ð1 ssÞscit ð1 scitÞð1 cÞ
Zx2
x2l
ðx x2lÞ f ðxÞ dxþ
Zx2u
x2
ðki cxÞ f ðxÞ dx
2
4
3
5:
ð30Þ
The impact on the advantageousness of a legal form is ambiguous. Without
further knowledge on the cash flows’ probability distribution, it is undetermined if
E½DTc2[E½DTp2 or vice versa. h
To further explain the occurring effects, we use x2p from above and x2r :¼
inffxjDc2ðxÞ  k krf g that distinguishes between the cases where the corpora-
tion’s interest payment is greater or smaller than the partnership’s. If x2r\x\x2u,
the corporation’s additional tax payment exceeds the partnership’s due to the higher
interest payment, as illustrated in Fig. 2. This risk premium effect discriminates
against the corporation. If x\x2r, the corporation’s additional tax payment falls
below the partnership’s, and it is even zero for x\x2l. This default effect, which
privileges the corporation, is driven by the fact that the partnership is mostly hit by
the IDR when cash flows are below the default threshold and the investors have to
stand in for the interest payment. The magnitude of both effects and, therefore, the
total impact of the IDR on the choice of organizational form depends on the
distribution of the gross return x.
4 IDR in the presence of a loss offset restriction (LOR)
The so far applied model assumes a full and immediate loss offset, resulting in a
negative tax base when cash flows are small. While the actual due tax amount
cannot be negative in most jurisdiction, taxable losses can usually be offset against
income from other sources and future profits. Full loss offset may, therefore, be a
realistic assumptions for sole proprietorships and partnerships. Opposed to that, a
defaulting corporation can make use of its taxable losses usually only in instances
where the sole corporate body is re-used in another business, such as in shell
company acquisitions. This is where loss offset restrictions (LOR) apply in many
tax jurisdictions. This section assumes that shareholders and partnerships can, but
corporations cannot offset taxable losses. This extends the presented model with a
loss offset restriction rule that averts a negative assessment basis on corporate level
such that TcitðxÞ 0 8 x. Variables and functions in this section are marked with the
subscript ‘‘’’ to denote that a loss offset restriction applies.
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4.1 Adjusted baseline model
In this section, we present an adjusted baseline model with no IDR in effect, but
with a loss offset restriction on corporate level. Interest is fully deductible and
default gains are fully taxable. The corporate income tax function now reads
TcitðxÞ ¼ maxf0; scitðx 1 ðDcðxÞ  kÞÞg
¼: scitðx 1 ðDcðxÞ  kÞÞ þ scit  LORðxÞ;
ð31Þ
where
LORðxÞ ¼:
0; if x 1þ ki;
ðx 1 ðDcðxÞ  kÞÞ; if x\1þ ki:
	
ð32Þ
The expected corporate income tax is thus
E½TcitðxÞ ¼ scitE½x 1 ðDcðxÞ  kÞ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
¼E½TcitðxÞ
þ scitE½LORðxÞ: ð33Þ
Comparing (33) with (7), one finds that the introduction of the LOR causes a rise in
tax amounting to scitE½LORðxÞ: As the creditors’ calculus (3) requires
E½DcðxÞ ¼ E½Dc, the first term in (33) equals the baseline model’s expected
corporate level tax. Since the rise in corporate tax translates into a decline in
dividend payout and, therefore, in dividend tax, we observe a change in expected
total tax in comparison to the baseline model of
E½DTcðxÞ ¼ ð1 ssÞ E½TcitðxÞ  E½TcitðxÞð Þ
¼ ð1 ssÞscitE½LORðxÞ ¼: LOR effect:
ð34Þ
The LOR effect is positive and naturally discriminates against corporations, while
the very amount depends on the distribution of cash flows:
E½LORðxÞ ¼
Z kð1þiÞ
0
ð1 kÞ
|ﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄ}
 0
f ðxÞ dxþ
Z 1þki
kð1þiÞ
ð1þ ki xÞ
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
 0
f ðxÞ dx  0: ð35Þ
Figure 3 illustrates the two integrals in scitE½LORðxÞ as areas between the abscissa
and the nominal corporate income tax function.
−τcit(1 − λ)
partial equity loss
default gain
full equity loss
x0∗ = λ + λi
Tcit(x)
x
λi
0
Dc∗(x) − λ
λ 1 + λi
−λ
− τcit1−τcit (1 − λ)
x0
partial
interest
full interest payment, profit
τcitE[LOR ∗ (x)]
Fig. 3 Effect of a loss offset restriction
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Interaction between loss offset and interest deductibility restrictions is analyzed
in the following.
4.2 Introduction of IDR
A leverage-based IDR—restricting interest deduction to the fraction a0 of total
interest, as discussed in Sect. 3.1—can be expressed by means of a tariff function
for corporate income tax
t1ðxÞ ¼ scit
x 1 ð1 a0ÞðDc1ðxÞ  kÞ; x k;
x 1 ð1 b0ÞðDc1ðxÞ  kÞ; x k;
	
ð36Þ
and analogously for an EBITDA-based IDR, restricting deduction to the fraction c
of EBITDA,
t2ðxÞ ¼ scit
x 1 cx; x 2 ðx2l; x2uÞ;
x 1 ðDc2ðxÞ  kÞ; else:
	
ð37Þ
Combining this with a loss offset restriction, the corporate income tax function
reads
Tcit;IDRðxÞ ¼ maxf0; tIDRðxÞg ¼:
0; x xIDR;t;
tIDRðxÞ; x xIDR;t;
	
ð38Þ
where IDR 2 f1; 2g denotes which of the two IDR applies and xIDR;t :¼
inffx 0jtIDRðxÞ[ 0g is the critical cash flow for the tariff function to become
positive. The LOR is binding for all x\xIDR;t:
Lemma 4 The expected change in total tax caused by the introduction of a
leverage-based IDR on top of an LOR—in comparison to the adjusted baseline
model—equals
E½DTc1ðxÞ  LOR effect ¼ AT  div effectþ DG effect þ interaction effect;
ð39Þ
where both AT ¼ sa0krf and div effect ¼ ssa0krf are identical with those in
Lemma 1,
DG effect ¼ a0ðs ssÞ
Z k
0
ðDc1ðxÞ  kÞ f ðxÞ dx ð40Þ
is a default gain effect as in Lemma 1 with parameter setting b0 ¼ 0, and
interaction effect\0 is distribution dependent.
As in the model with full loss offset in Sect. 3.1, AT is the additional tax caused
by the leverage-based IDR when legal form specific effects are neglected, and the
dividend effect reduces a corporation’s tax burden as compared to a partnership.
Business Research (2015) 8:3–37 19
123
In combination of the LOR with the leverage-based IDR, an interaction effect
results: in loss scenarios where the tax base is already negative, the IDR would only
reduce tax refunds which are already excluded by the LOR. This effect is pro
corporation because it renders the IDR partially ineffective for corporations. Thus,
the disadvantage of the corporation compared to the partnership decreases.
Furthermore, a symmetric treatment of interest and default gains that partially
exempts default gains from taxation is no longer possible in the presence of an LOR
(DG effect is always present). This is because an exemption would only add to an
existing tax refund, which again is excluded by the LOR. This effect is contra
corporation. Another contra corporation effect is that the excluded tax refunds in
loss scenarios increase the expected default gain and thus the default gain effect.
Creditors have to be compensated by paying a higher risk premium, to keep the
expected creditors’ return constant.
Proposition 8 In a tax system with a loss offset restriction on corporate level, the
introduction of a leverage-based IDR has an arbitrary effect on the investors’
choice of legal form depending on the cash flows’ distribution assumption.
Proof It is analytically undetermined which of the counteracting and distribution
dependent effects (dividend and interaction effects vs. default gain effect) stands
out. The higher the probability that x 2 ½k; 1þ ki, the more does the interaction
effect reduce the LOR effect, pronouncing the corporation’s privilege from the
dividend effect. Contrary to that, if Pðx\kÞ is sufficiently large, the default gain
effect may overcompensate the dividend and interaction effects and turn the
privileging into a discrimination of corporations. h
Figure 4 illustrates the LOR tax as the area between the tariff function t1ðxÞ and
the abscissa.
The implication of Proposition 8 is that a leverage-based IDR cannot be neutral
to the choice of legal form if an LOR on corporate level is present.
Next consider an EBITDA-based IDR:
Lemma 5 An EBITDA-based IDR is effective for a corporation with LOR if and
only if c
1c\ki.
λi
x
x1t∗
t1∗(x)
λ + λi
−τcit(1 − λ(1 − α ))
Dc1∗(x) − λdefault gain interestpartial
−τcit(1 − λ)
1 + λi
λ0
default gain eﬀect
interaction eﬀect
Fig. 4 LOR combined with leverage-based IDR
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In a setting with an LOR, an EBITDA-based IDR is thus mostly ineffective,
unless the c parameter is utterly small or the firm is highly leveraged. Introducing
the IDR in a tax system where only corporations are subject to an LOR, therefore,
adds a stronger burden on partnerships than on corporations. The following analysis
assumes c
1c\ki.
Lemma 6 If c[ i, an EBITDA-based IDR is ineffective in default scenarios,
because x2t[ x2:
Lemma 7 If an EBITDA-based IDR is effective for a corporation and if c[ i, the
increase in expected total tax burden caused by the introduction of the IDR on top of
an existing LOR equals
E½DTc2ðxÞ  DTcðxÞ ¼ ð1 ssÞscit
Z1þki
x2t
ðxð1 cÞ  1Þ
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
 0
f ðxÞ dxþ
Zx2u
1þki
ðki cxÞ
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
 0
f ðxÞ dx
2
64
3
75:
ð41Þ
Proposition 9 In a tax system with a loss offset restriction on corporate level, the
introduction of an IDR that limits deduction of interest to the fraction c of EBITDA
has an arbitrary effect on the investors’ choice of legal form depending on the cash
flows’ distribution assumption, if the IDR is binding for a corporation and if the
deduction parameter c exceeds the risky interest rate i.
Proof Given these conditions, Lemmata 6 and 7 hold. Comparing (41) and (25)
shows easily that the increase in total tax burden that is caused by the introduction
of the IDR may be larger or smaller for any legal form, depending on the
distribution assumption. h
5 Numerical illustrations
Sections 3 and 4 show that there are a number of cases where the outcomes depend
on the assumed probability distribution of cash flows. The aim of this section is to
illustrate the analytically found effects for reasonable parameter settings and
distribution assumptions using German tax facts and gross return data from German
firms as an example.
5.1 Setup
Tax parameters Following German tax law, we assume a corporate tax system with
shareholder relief, where a corporate income tax rate of scit :¼ 30% is imposed on
corporate level and a dividend tax of ss :¼ 25% on shareholder level, which results
in a total tax burden of sc :¼ scit þ ssð1 scitÞ ¼ 47:5%. Partnerships are treated as
pass-through entities and pay a personal income tax rate sp. We set sp ¼ sc ¼: s so
as to achieve neutrality in the baseline model.
Business Research (2015) 8:3–37 21
123
Interest deductibility restrictions The IDR with a leverage-based restriction
exhibits distribution dependent effects in the case of ss[ 0 (positive dividend
taxation) and a0[ b0 (asymmetric treatment of default gains). We now focus on this
case and set b0 ¼ 0 (default gains are fully taxable) and a ¼ 1:5, which allows for a
debt-to-equity ratio of 1.5 to 1, equivalent to a debt-to-total assets ratio of 60 %, and
excludes interest expenses on exceeding debt from deduction. This is a typical
allowance limit applied by a number of tax jurisdictions including France, the
United States, and until 2008 also Germany. Other countries implemented the same
rule with different debt-to-equity ratio limits, among them Canada (2 to 1), Japan
and New Zealand (3 to 1), the Netherlands, Latvia and Lithuania (4 to 1) as well as
Luxembourg (6 to 1). For a broader overview of allowance limits refer to Webber
(2010).
The IDR’s impact on the choice of legal form splits up into two components, a
dividend effect and a default gain effect. From the theoretical analysis we know that
in the considered scenario (ss[ 0, a0[ b0), the default gain effect puts a higher
burden on corporations, whereas the dividend effect always gives an advantage to
corporations over partnerships. The choice of legal form depends on which effect
stands out. The allowance parameter a determines the total effect’s magnitude, but
not the direction. If an IDR turns out to discriminate against one legal form, a higher
a results in a lower a0 and less discrimination, but cannot result in an advantage for
the very legal form. We keep a constant and vary k between 0 and 1 to analyze
which of the two effects usually stands out and which legal form is advantaged
when realistic parameters are assumed.
The second common interest disallowance rule is one that limits the net interest
expenses to a fraction c of EBITDA. Typical values for c are 30 % (Germany since
2008, Italy) and 50 % (United States, applied as an additional condition after the
debt-to-equity test). In line with the current German law, we use a parameter value
of c ¼ 30%.
Interest rates Debt capital for a partnership with unlimited liability is available at
the risk-free interest rate rf . Empirical rates are taken from default-free zero coupon
bonds with term to maturity of ten years, as estimated by Deutsche Bundesbank for
the debt securities market (Listed Federal securities, Svensson method). The ten
year term is an estimate for an average loan period. We use 2012’s average daily
value of 1.686 % for the risk-free interest rate rf . To test robustness, we present
sensitivity analyses with varying rf .
The risk premium for a corporation with limited liability is endogenously
determined by the condition E½DcðxÞ ¼ kð1þ rf Þ. This is one of the main
contributions from the simulation: while there is no analytical solution to the
endogenous interest rate, a numerical approximation is readily available at high
precision. The lack of an analytical solution is caused by the fact that the relevant
probability distributions, such as the normal distribution or Levy alpha-stable
distributions have no closed form solutions for the cumulative distribution
functions. Note that the probability of default is, too, endogenously determined
by the interest rate, a connection that is often ignored.
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Distribution assumption The firm’s project requires a one-time investment of
I0 :¼ 1 at time t ¼ 0 and results in an uncertain gross return of x  I0 at time t ¼ 1.
Empirical data is needed to calibrate the probability distribution of x. The challenge
in adjusting the theoretical one-period model to a real world scenario is to fit
empirical observations into the model’s distribution assumption of gross return
earned by the modeled company. Real world data from going concern businesses
can at most give an estimate. This restriction applies to empirical distribution data
as much as to any theoretical distribution with empirically adjusted parameters.
Note that we only use empirical data to obtain a reasonable distribution of cash
flows.
The variable x denotes a company’s life time period’s cash flows, normalized to
the initial investment expenditure I0 that is required to generate the very amount of
cash flows. Since the model assumes the company’s liquidation at the end of the
investment horizon as well as full capitalization and depreciation of the investment
expenditure, the gross return x is indeed identical to the amount of cash flows over
the firm’s life time. Opposed to that, empirical data reflect a single period in the life
time of a going concern business. We assume that the randomly picked period is a
representative fraction of the companies’ life times. We approximate the invested
capital I0 by the average of the stated balance sheet totals at the beginning and the
end of the financial year and we approximate the gross return x  I0 by the sum of
EBIT and invested capital. The normalized gross return thus calculates to
x ¼ EBIT
average balance sheet total
þ 1:
We use empirical data from the Dafne database (Bureau van Dijk) to feed our
simulation model’s gross return variable x. In accordance with the empirical risk-
free interest data, we select accounting data from the financial year 2012. The
database contains individual financial accounting data (German GAAP) from
German companies in 21 industrial sectors. We select only individual financial
statements from corporations following German Commercial Code (HGB) and
remove records with missing EBITDA data or balance sheet totals. We further
remove the public administration and defense sector, the sector of households as
employers, as well as extraterritorial organizations and also records with missing
industry code. The final sample contains 43,108 observations in 18 sectors. For
descriptives on legal form and size (balance sheet totals as of 2012) refer to Table 1.
We winsorize large values of x at the 1 % percentile and set negative values to
zero. In our single-period modeling, a company cannot lose more than the initially
Table 1 Descriptives on the applied data set
Legal form Obs. Total assets in million Euro
Mean Median SD
GmbH (limited liability corporations) 40,574 94 % 36 2.7 410
AG (stock corporations) 2,167 5 % 1,062 18.3 10,442
Other 367 1 % 1,041 0.2 8,463
Total 43,108 100 %
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invested amount, while in a multi-period setting, each single period’s cash flow can
well be negative. The resulting distribution has a mean value of l  1:08 and a
standard deviation of r  17:41%. Figure 5 shows the distribution’s density curve
with data from 2012.
5.2 Leverage-based IDR
We perform the simulation with varying parameter combinations and measure the
corporation’s tax advantage, cta, defined as the difference between the partnership’s
and the corporation’s expected total tax burden, including shareholder level tax.
Consequently, we repeat each analysis with the alteration that the IDR is
introduced in a model world with an existing loss offset restriction on corporate
level. The reference point for legal form dependent effects is the adjusted baseline
model where the LOR is already in effect: we consider only tax differences caused
by the IDR on top of the LOR. The target function is thus the corporation’s net tax
advantage, cnta, which is net of the LOR’s tax effect.
Influence from leverage. With an a parameter of 1.5, the leverage-based IDR is
binding for leverage above the binding threshold of k0 ¼ 60%. We first vary the
leverage parameter k, keeping the remaining parameters constant, and describe the
corporation’s tax advantage, cta, as a continuous function of k. With increasing k
above the binding threshold, we find ctaðkÞ typically first increase, then decrease,
eventually becoming negative. The function has at most one change of sign at the
critical leverage, kcrit. It is positive for k\kcrit and negative for k[ kcrit. This is
because the dividend effect increases linearly in k, while the default gain effect
exhibits exponential shape. It usually starts weaker than the dividend effect and
eventually approaches or surpasses it, as illustrated in Fig. 6. There is at most one
point of intersection at k ¼ kcrit.
The picture remains essentially unchanged when different parameter values for
the risk-free interest rate are applied or data samples with varying risk are used.
Changing these parameters, kcrit moves either left or right in the graph. The function
ctaðkÞ may become strictly positive or strictly negative for all k[ k0, if the critical
leverage moves right or left out of the domain of definition.
Fig. 5 Density curve of empirical gross return x
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To test for robustness, we conduct the analysis with data for the financial years
2008 through 2012 as well as with a combined data set built from data using all five
years, and we do this with risk-free interest rates taken from default-free zero
coupon bonds with term to maturity of 1 year, 5, 10 and 30 years. Lastly, we run the
analysis on sub-samples for each of the contained industries, each of which exhibits
a different average gross return and standard deviation. The results remain
qualitatively unchanged.
Influence from LOR. The graph of cntaðkÞ exhibits visually the same shape as
ctaðkÞ, but the critical leverage is for most parameter combinations slightly larger
when an LOR is effective, enlarging the range of possible k where the corporation is
privileged (Fig. 7). The main effect is that in events of loss, the IDR cannot affect
the corporation, as the tax base is already negative and the due tax amount tight to
zero by the LOR, but the IDR unchangedly affects the partnership, increasing the
corporation’s net tax advantage cnta (interaction effect). In some cases (not
illustrated in this figure), this effect can be compensated by an increase in the default
gain effect, refer to Sect. 4.2. Figure 7 depicts the relative advantage for a
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corporation caused by the IDR (rather than the absolute advantage) taking the
adjusted baseline model as the reference where the LOR is already effective.
Influence from risk-free interest. A larger risk-free interest rate rf has an
increasing impact on the critical leverage kcrit. We vary rf from 0 to 2 % and
determine the resulting critical leverage. Figure 8 suggests kcrit being homogenous
in rf with degree between zero and one. This picture does not change when an LOR
is assumed, only the critical leverage values are slightly larger. Note that kcrit is
defined only for an interval of rf and would extend to values [ 100 % for larger rf
and to values \k0 for smaller rf . If rf ¼ 0, the partnership is advantageous for any
k[ k0, and the IDR cannot bind for k k0: There is thus no critical leverage
defined in this case.
If rf ¼ 0, the partnership pays no interest and is, therefore, not affected by the
IDR. The corporation pays a risk premium and is negatively affected by the IDR if
k[ k0, which is why the corporation is discriminated against for small rf . As rf
increases, the dividend effect increases (pro corporation) and the default gain effect
remains constant, depending only on k. If rf is sufficiently large, k looses its
influence and the corporation is always privileged, because k is restricted to the
interval ½0; 1, the default gain effect is, therefore, too, bounded above and is
eventually dominated by the unrestricted dividend effect for large rf . For medium
rf , the default gain effect can compensate the dividend effect if k is sufficiently
large. The critical leverage is thus increasing in rf and enlarges the range of possible
k where the corporation is advantageous.
Influence from risk. Working with the full sample of all industries, we vary the
distributions’ standard deviation by applying a mean-preserving spread to each x-
value. (Note that this method works well with spread-reducing factors\1, but does
not with spread-amplifying factors[1 as the resulting distribution would obtain
negative cash flow values, contrary to the model assumptions.)
We find that risk seems to have a negative impact on the corporation’s tax
advantage, reducing the critical leverage. This is because the dividend effect is
independent from risk, whereas the default gain effect is a multiple of the expected
default gain. That is why the distribution of cash flows below the critical cash flow
xDG does and that above xDG does not affect ctaðkÞ and kcrit. The greater the
investment’s risk, the greater is in general the probability of a default gain,
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Pðx\xDGÞ, as well as the expected amount of default gain if one occurs. The default
gain effect acts in the manner of a tax on default gains. If risk is low and
Pðx\xDGÞ ¼ 0, the default gain effect vanishes and due to the dividend effect, the
corporation is privileged for any k. Figure 9 shows the relation between the cash
flow distribution’s standard deviation and kcrit.
5.3 EBITDA-based IDR
The EBITDA-based IDR is in a number of cases only binding for the partnership,
but not for the corporation. As compared to the leverage-based IDR, the EBITDA-
based IDR thus more often discriminates against the partnership. The reason is that
the IDR can only bind when leverage is high and EBITDA is small, such that
30%  EBITDA\k  i. The greater the leverage and the smaller the EBITDA,
however, the greater is the corporation’s probability of default, the smaller is the
interest actually paid and the smaller is the chance that the IDR is at all binding for
the corporation. Opposed to that, the partnership always pays full interest and is,
therefore, mostly hit by the IDR in events of loss. When introduced on top of an
existing loss offset restriction, this effect is a little less pronounced: the LOR
increases the risky interest rate i demanded by creditors, thereby increasing the
IDR’s upper binding bound x2u ¼ ki30%, moving it closer to the cash flow
distribution’s peak value. This increases the chance that the IDR is binding for a
corporation.
As with the leverage-based IDR, an increasing risk-free interest rate is usually
pro corporation: A larger risk-free interest rate rf increases both the due and the paid
interest amount and increases the chance that the IDR binds for both legal forms.
The effect is usually stronger for the partnership, thus increasing the corporation’s
tax advantage, for relevant parameter combinations.
Contrary to the leverage-based IDR, a greater standard deviation in the
distribution of cash flows increased the corporation’s advantage in the analyzed
scenarios. This has no effect on the critical leverage, however, as corporations are
privileged for any leverage in these cases.
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6 Conclusion
Previous research shows the effects of IDR on firms’ leverage ratios and investment
policies but almost completely neglects the effect on the choice of organizational
form. We show that both forms of IDR—leverage based as well as EBITDA
based—generally distort the choice of organizational form. Only under very specific
assumptions, i.e., full loss offset, symmetric taxation of default gains and interest,
and either legal form specific IDR parameters or absence of dividend taxation, a
leverage-based IDR is neutral to the choice of organizational form. A summary of
the results regarding the leverage-based IDR under full loss offset is provided in
Table 2.
The effect of the EBITDA-based IDR on the organizational form depends on the
cash flow distribution and is, therefore, theoretically undetermined. Moreover, if we
assume corporate loss offset restrictions, both forms of IDR always distort the
decision between limited and unlimited liability firms. The effect of corporate loss
offset restrictions is threefold: first, due to the missing loss offset for corporations,
IDR are ineffective in case of losses. This privileges the corporation. Second, a tax
exemption of a default gain that could compensate for the restricted interest
deductibility is not effective due to the missing loss offset. Third, due to the missing
loss offset, creditors will receive lower payments in the case of insolvency. This
increases the expected default gain and the risk premium. This in turn leads to a
higher effect of the IDR. In contrast to the first effect, the other two effects
discriminate against the corporation. Thus, the total effect is undetermined and
depends on the distribution of the cash flows, the leverage ratio, and the risk-free
interest rates as we additionally illustrate in Monte Carlo simulations.
The policy implications are obvious: if legislators aim to achieve organizational
form neutrality, this aim is generally in conflict with the introduction of IDR even if
a uniform treatment of organizational forms with respect to IDR (such as is
implemented in many countries) is applied. Also note that although we restrict our
analysis to only two forms of IDR, the leverage-based IDR is in fact comparable to a
proportional limitation of interest deductibility such as is used, e.g., in Germany for
trade tax purposes. For any given debt ratio one can show the identity of
proportional restrictions and leverage-based IDR. Additionally, while our model
covers only third-party debt it could easily be extended to internal debt. Many IDR
treat payments on internal debt as constructive dividends. In these cases our results
Table 2 Results for leverage-based interest deduction restrictions
Treatment of default gains and interest payments Dividend taxation Advantaged legal form
Symmetric (b ¼ a) =0 Neutral
Symmetric (b ¼ a) [0 Corporation
Symmetric, legal form specific parameters [0 Neutral
b[ a C0 Corporation
b\a =0 Partnership
b\a [0 Distribution dependent
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hold if (1) the tax rate on dividends equals the tax rate on interest revenues, (2) the
interest rate equals the arm’s length interest rate, and (3) losses due to a debtor’s
default are fully tax deductible at the same tax rate as interest payments. The last
two conditions ensure the creditor’s calculus to remain unchanged and the first one
implies that one can neglect tax effects on shareholder level caused by constructive
dividends.
From a tax research perspective it is worth to mention that future studies
investigating organizational from neutrality of tax systems should consider that
different legal forms face different liability rules and a uniform application of tax
rules may, thus, be inappropriate to achieve organizational form neutrality.
Furthermore, our results are also relevant for the discussion of the tax effect on
the amount of collateral a shareholder should offer to the creditors of his or her
corporation. Often corporations are de facto not limited in their liability, but, on the
contrary, their owners offer personal guarantees to receive a loan for the firm. Then,
the assumptions on liability differences among the organizational forms in this
paper do not hold. However, our findings then apply for the owners’ decision to
offer a guarantee to the creditors or not—again a choice between limited and
unlimited liability. The only difference is that in this case we would not have a
dividend effect so that only the default gain effect remains. Therefore, one can
conclude that IDR also distort the owners decision to offer collateral if default gains
and interest payments are treated asymmetrically. Table 2 shows that legal rules that
restrict the deductibility of interest expenses, but fully tax default gains (a0[ b0)
such as, e.g., the current tax regime in Germany provides an incentive to secure a
loan by offering collateral.
Of course the used model is subject to some limitations. Most important, we only
used a single-period model with no information asymmetries between borrowers
and lenders. In our opinion this is sufficient to show the main effects of IDR on the
choice of organizational form. In addition, we assumed that earnings before interest,
taxes, depreciation, and amortization do not depend on the legal form. This neglects
the fact that the legal form decision may affect risk taking and, therefore, cash flows.
However, since our focus is on tax non-neutrality to the legal form decision, we
believe our point gets clearer when holding all other decisions constant, including
the investment decision, switching only the legal form. Moreover, the choice of
legal form affects the risk taking of managers only if creditors cannot perfectly
monitor the corporate activities which is in contrast to our assumption of symmetric
information. In sum, it seems useful to expand the model to a multi-period setting in
future research and maybe also to incorporate behavioral uncertainties resulting
from information asymmetry.
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Appendix: Omitted proofs
Proof of Lemma 1 We define the expected increase in corporate income tax caused
by the proportional IDR as
E DTcit1ðxÞ½  :¼ E Tcit1ðxÞ½   E TcitðxÞ½ ; ð42Þ
where Tcit1ðxÞ and TcitðxÞ are the corporation’s tax payments with and without the
IDR in effect,
TcitðxÞ :¼ scitðx 1 ðDcðxÞ  kÞÞ; and ð43Þ
Tcit1ðxÞ :¼ scitðx 1 ðDc1ðxÞ  kÞÞ þ scitIDR1ðxÞ; ð44Þ
with IDR1ðxÞ from Definition (12). Using E½Dc1ðxÞ ¼ E½DcðxÞ, one obtains
E Tcit1ðxÞ½  ¼ scitE x 1 ðDc1ðxÞ  kÞ½ |ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
¼E½TcitðxÞ
þscitE IDR1ðxÞ½  ð45Þ
and thus
E DTcit1ðxÞ½  ¼ scitE IDR1ðxÞ½ : ð46Þ
The increase in tax burden on corporate level leads to an equally large decrease in
dividend payment and in consequence to a decrease in shareholder level tax, such
that
E DTc1ðxÞ½  ¼ E 1 ssð ÞDTcit1ðxÞ½  ¼ 1 ssð ÞscitE IDR1ðxÞ½ ; ð47Þ
where
E IDR1ðxÞ½  ¼
Z1
xDG
a0 Dc1ðxÞ  kð Þ f xð Þdxþ
ZxDG
0
b0 Dc1ðxÞ  kð Þ f xð Þdx; ð48Þ
with probability density function f ðxÞ.
Rearranging and using ð1 ssÞscit ¼ s ss leads to
E DTc1ðxÞ½  ¼ s ssð Þ


a0
Z1
0
Dc1ðxÞ  kð Þf xð Þdxþ b0  a0ð Þ
ZxDG
0
Dc1ðxÞ  kð Þ f xð Þdx

¼ ðs ssÞ a0 E Dc1ðxÞ½   kð Þ þ 1 ssð Þscit b0  a0ð Þ
ZxDG
0
Dc1ðxÞ  kð Þf xð Þdx:
ð49Þ
Substituting E Dc1ðxÞ½   k ¼ krf from condition (3) yields (13). h
Proof of Lemma 2 For x ¼ xDG, we have Dc1ðxÞ ¼ x Tcit1ðxÞ ¼ k and we know
from definition (12) that IDR1ðxDGÞ ¼ 0, therefore,
30 Business Research (2015) 8:3–37
123
Tcit1ðxDGÞ ¼ scitðxDG  1 ðDc1ðxDGÞ  kÞÞ þ 0
¼ scitðxDG  1 ðxDG  Tcit1ðxDGÞ  kÞÞ
¼ scitð1 kÞ þ scitTcit1ðxDGÞ
¼  scit
1 scit ð1 kÞ
ð50Þ
and xDG ¼ kþ Tcit1ðxDGÞ ¼ k scit
1 scit  ð1 kÞ: ð51Þ
For x xDG, we have Dc1ðxÞ ¼ x Tcit1ðxÞ and IDR1ðxÞ ¼ b0 Dc1ðxÞ  kð Þ,
therefore,
Tcit1ðxÞ ¼ scitðx 1 ðDc1ðxÞ  kÞÞ þ scitb0 Dc1ðxÞ  kð Þ
¼ scitðx 1 ðx Tcit1ðxÞ  kÞÞ þ scitb0 x Tcit1ðxÞ  kð Þ
¼ scitðð1 kÞ þ b0 x kð ÞÞ þ scitð1 b0ÞTcit1ðxÞ
¼ hb1ð1 k b0 x kð ÞÞ 8x xDG
ð52Þ
and Dc1ðxÞ ¼ xþ hb1ð1 k b x kð ÞÞ 8x xDG; ð53Þ
where hb1 : ¼ scit
1 scitð1 b0Þ
: ð54Þ
Applying (51) and (53) in (22), we can resolve the default gain expectancy:
EDG ¼
Z xDG
0
ðDc1ðxÞ  kÞ f ðxÞ dx ¼
Z xDG
0
xþ hb1ð1 k x kð Þb0Þ  k
 
f ðxÞ dx
¼
Z xDG
0

xþ hb1 xDG  xð Þb0  k hb1  1 k xDG  kð Þb0ð Þ
 
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
¼kþTcit1ðxDGÞ¼xDG

f ðxÞ dx
¼
Z xDG
0

x 1 hb1b0
  xDG 1 hb1b0
 
f ðxÞ dx
¼ 1 hb1b0
  
Z xDG
0
x f ðxÞ dx xDG 1 hb1b0
  
Z xDG
0
f ðxÞ dx
¼  1 scit
1 scitð1 b0Þ  xDG  E xjx\xDG½ ð Þ  Pðx\xDGÞ:
ð55Þ
Applying (55) in (21) yields (23). h
Proof of Lemma 3 Solving (26) yields Tcit2ðxÞ ¼ scitðx 1 cxÞ; 8 x 2 ðx2l; x2uÞ;
and using this as well as IDR2ðx2lÞ ¼ IDR2ðx2uÞ ¼ 0 in Dc2ðxÞ ¼
x Tcit2ðxÞ; if x\x2;
kð1þ iÞ; else;
	
results in
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IDR2ðxÞ ¼
x scitðx 1 cxÞ  k cx; if x2l x\x2;
ki cx; if x2 x x2u;
	
¼ xð1 scitÞð1 cÞ  ðk scitÞ; if x2l x\x2;
ki cx; if x2 x x2u;
	 ð56Þ
To obtain x2l; set IDR2ðx2lÞ¼! 0 and find that x2l ¼ kscitð1scitÞð1cÞ :
This allows direct calculation of E½IDR2ðxÞ as follows:
E½IDR2ðxÞ ¼
Z 1
0
IDR2ðxÞf ðxÞ dx ¼
Z x2u
x2l
ðDc2ðxÞ  k cxÞ f ðxÞ dx
¼
Z x2
x2l
ð1 scitÞð1 cÞ x k scitð1 scitÞð1 cÞ

 
f ðxÞ dxþ
Z x2u
x2
ðki cxÞ f ðxÞ dx
¼
Z x2
x2l
ðx x2lÞð1 scitÞð1 cÞ f ðxÞ dxþ
Z x2u
x2
ðki cxÞ f ðxÞ dx
ð57Þ
h
Proof of Lemma 4 To see (39), rewrite (38) to
Tcit1ðxÞ ¼ scitðx 1 ðDc1ðxÞ  kÞÞ þ scitIDR1ðxÞ þ scitLOR1ðxÞ ð58Þ
where
IDR1ðxÞ ¼
a0ðDc1ðxÞ  kÞ; x k;
b0ðDc1ðxÞ  kÞ; x\k;
	
¼ a0ðDc1ðxÞ  kÞ þ
0; x k;
ðb0  a0Þðx kÞ; x\k;
	 ð59Þ
and
LOR1ðxÞ ¼
TðxÞ; x x1t;
0; else;
	
¼
0; x x1t;
1 k b0ðx kÞ; x k;
1 k a0ðx kÞ; k\x minfx1; x1tg;
1þ ð1 a0Þki x; minfx1; x1tg\x\xt1:
8
>><
>>:
ð60Þ
Taking expectancies in (58) yields the expected change in corporate income tax,
E½DTcit1ðxÞ ¼ E½Tcit1ðxÞ  E½TcitðxÞ ¼ scitE½IDR1ðxÞ þ scitE½LOR1ðxÞ;
ð61Þ
and multiplying with ð1 ssÞ yields the expected change in total tax,
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E½DTc1ðxÞ ¼ ð1 ssÞE½DTcit1ðxÞ
¼ ð1 ssÞscitE½IDR1ðxÞ þ LOR1ðxÞ
¼ ðs ssÞE½IDR1ðxÞ þ LOR1ðxÞ
¼ ðs ssÞ a0krf þ
Zm
0
ð1 k a0ðx kÞÞ
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
[ 0
f ðxÞ dxþ
Zx1t
m
ðx1t  xÞ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
 0
f ðxÞ dx
2
64
3
75:
¼: AT div effectþ residual
ð62Þ
where m ¼ minfx1; x1tg, AT ¼ sa0krf and div effect ¼ ssa0krf .
The residual in (62) makes up the DG effect, the LOR effect and an interaction
effect. To analyze these, two cases must be distinguished: The risky interest rate i
demanded by creditors is affected by the IDR if and only if x1t\x1, i.e., if corporate
income tax can be positive in a default scenario and, therefore, further reduce debt
service. To obtain x1, set Dc1ðx1Þ ¼ kð1þ iÞ ¼ x1  Tcit1ðx1Þ, which solves
to x1 ¼ kð1þ iÞ þ Tcit1ðx1Þ. Using this in definition (38) yields t1ðx1Þ ¼
scitðx1  1 ð1 a0ÞkiÞ ¼ scitðkð1þ iÞ þ Tcit1ðx1Þ  1 ð1 a0ÞkiÞ ¼ scitTcit1
ðx1Þ þ scitða0ki ð1 kÞÞ. Now note that t1 and Tcit1 are equal if t1 is positive
and Tcit1 ¼ 0 if t1 is negative. Thus:
t1ðx1Þ 0 ) t1ðx1Þ ¼ 0þ scitða0ki ð1 kÞÞ ) a0ki 1 k
t1ðx1Þ[ 0 ) Tcit1ðx1Þ ¼ t1ðx1Þ ¼ scitt1ðx1Þ þ scitða0ki ð1 kÞÞ
¼ scit
1 scit ða
0ki ð1 kÞÞ ) a0ki[ 1 k
and taken together:
x1t\x1 , t1ðx1Þ[ 0 , a0ki[ 1 k: ð63Þ
Only a strict non-deduction factor a0 combined with high leverage will thus affect
the demanded interest rate. The intuition behind this result is that in case of cash
flows just allowing full debt service (x ¼ x1), the complete loss of equity (1 k)
usually makes for a negative tax base, but can be compensated by the non-
deductible interest (a0ki).
Case 1: If a0ki 1 k, the residual in (62) is directly comparable to the LOR
effect (34) in the adjusted baseline model, as the interest rate i has the same value in
both formulae, and the critical cash flow is x1 ¼ x1 ¼ kð1þ iÞ in both models. To
obtain x1t, note that TðxÞ[ 0 , x[ 1þ ð1 a0ÞðDc1ðxÞ  kÞ, and thus
x1t ¼ 1þ kið1 a0Þ. Subtracting the LOR effect as well as a DG effect with
parameter b0 ¼ 0 yields
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interaction effect :¼ residual LOR effect  DG effect
¼ ðs ssÞ
Z x1
0
ð1 k a0ðx kÞÞ f ðxÞ dxþ
Z x1t
x1
ðx1t  xÞ f ðxÞ dx

Z x1
0
ð1 kÞ f ðxÞ dx
Z 1þki
x1
ð1þ ki xÞ f ðxÞ dx

 DG effect
¼ ðs ssÞ a0
Z x1t
k
ðDc1ðxÞ  kÞ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
 0
f ðxÞ dxþ
Z 1þki
x1t
ð1þ ki xÞ
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
 0
f ðxÞ dx
2
64
3
75\0
ð64Þ
Case 2: If a0ki[ 1 k, the above analysis remains true, except that the risky
interest rate i increases to j[ i, compared to the adjusted baseline model, and that
x1t ¼ kþ 1ka0 \x1 ¼ kð1þ iÞ\kð1þ jÞ\x1. Subtraction yields
interaction effect :¼ residual LOR effectDG effect
¼ ðs ssÞ
Z x1t
0
ð1 k a0ðx kÞÞ f ðxÞdx
Z x1
0
ð1 kÞ f ðxÞdx n

DG effect
¼ ðs ssÞ
Z x1t
k
1 k a0ðx kÞð Þ f ðxÞdx
Z x1
k
ð1 kÞ f ðxÞdx n

¼ ðs ssÞ
Z x1t
k
a0ðx kÞ
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
0
f ðxÞ dxþ
Z x1
x1t
ð1 kÞ
|ﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄ}
 0
f ðxÞdxþ n

\0;
ð65Þ
where n :¼ R 1þki
x1
ð1þ ki xÞ
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
 0
f ðxÞdx. h
Proof of Lemma 5 First, set IDR2ðxÞ ¼ Dc2ðxÞ  k cx¼! 0, to obtain x2l ¼ k1c
and x2u ¼ kic , and rewrite the tariff function to
t2ðxÞ ¼ scit
x 1 ki; x x2u;
xð1 cÞ  1; x 2 ðx2l; x2uÞ
ð1 kÞ; x x2l:
8
><
>:
; ð66Þ
The IDR can be effective at all only if xt2\x2u. If so, setting t2ðxt2Þ ¼
xt2ð1 cÞ  1¼! 0 yields xt2 ¼ 11c\x2u ¼ kic . Otherwise, setting t2ðxt2Þ ¼
xt2  1 ki¼ 0
!
yields xt2 ¼ 1þ ki[ x2u ¼ kic . Taken together, one obtains
xt2\x2u if and only if c1c\ki.
If c
1c  ki, the tax base is negative for all x where the IDR is binding,
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t2ðxÞ
scit
jx2ðx1l;x2uÞ ¼ xð1 cÞ  1
xc
ki
 1\ x2uc
ki
 1 ¼ 0; ð67Þ
the tax payment is thus zero due to the LOR, and the IDR not effective. h
Proof of Lemma 6 A corporation defaults on debt service if x\x2. Positive tax for
any x\x2 implies Tcit2ðx2Þ[ 0, as the tariff function is monotonically increasing
in x, and is, therefore, equivalent to Tðx2Þ ¼ x2ð1 cÞ  1[ 0 and to x2[ 11c.
To obtain x2, solve Dc2ðx2Þ ¼ kð1þ iÞ ¼ x2  Tcit2ðx2Þ, which yields
x2 ¼ kð1þ iÞ þ Tcit2ðx2Þ; ð68Þ
and if Tcit2ðx2Þ[ 0 solves to x2 ¼ kð1þiÞ1c [ 11c, which easily transforms to
kð1þ iÞ[ 1
1c. Taken together, one can conclude
Tcitðx2Þ[ 0 , kð1þ iÞ[ 1
1 c, 1 c[
1
kð1þ iÞ
, c\1 1
kð1þ iÞ ¼
i
1þ i
1 k
kð1þ iÞ 	 i:
ð69Þ
If on the contrary c[ i, the corporate income tax payment is zero for all x x2 and
the IDR, therefore, not effective. h
Proof of Lemma 7 Proposition 5 and Lemma 6 provide
x2 ¼ kð1þ iÞ x2t ¼ 1
1 c\1þ ki\x2u ¼
ki
c
: ð70Þ
Rewriting (38) as Tcit2ðxÞ ¼ scitðx 1 ðDc2ðxÞ  kÞÞ þ scitðIDR2ðxÞ þ
LOR2ðxÞÞ yields
IDR2ðxÞ ¼
ki cx; x 2 ½x2; x2uÞ;
xð1 cÞ  k; x 2 ðx2l; x2Þ;
0 else;
8
><
>:
ð71Þ
LOR2ðxÞ ¼
0; x x2t;
1 xð1 cÞ; x 2 ðx2l; x2tÞ;
1 k; x x2l;
8
><
>:
ð72Þ
In comparison to the baseline model without LOR and without IDR, the expected
increase in corporate income tax is
E½DTcit2ðxÞ ¼ E½Tcit2ðxÞ  E½TcitðxÞ ¼ scitE½IDR2ðxÞ þ LOR2ðxÞ; ð73Þ
and the expected increase in total tax burden is
E½DTc2ðxÞ ¼ ð1 ssÞE½DTcit2ðxÞ ¼ ð1 ssÞscitE½IDR2ðxÞ þ LOR2ðxÞ; ð74Þ
where
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E½IDR2ðxÞ þ LOR2ðxÞ
¼
Zx2
0
ð1 kÞ f ðxÞ dxþ
Zx2t
x2
ð1þ ki xÞ f ðxÞ dxþ
Zx2u
x2t
ðki cxÞ f ðxÞ dx: ð75Þ
To obtain the tax increase caused by the introduction of the IDR when the LOR is
already present, the value of E½LORðxÞ from (35) must be subtracted, resulting in
E½IDR2ðxÞ þ LOR2ðxÞ  LORðxÞ
¼
Z1þki
x2t
ðxð1 cÞ  1Þ
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
 0
f ðxÞ dxþ
Zx2u
1þki
ðki cxÞ
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
 0
f ðxÞ dx: ð76Þ
h
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